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Abstract
We give the natural topological model for ¬BD-N, and use it to show
that the closure of spaces with the anti-Specker property under product
does not imply BD-N. Also, the natural topological model for ¬BD is
presented. Finally, for some of the realizability models known indirectly
to falsify BD-N, it is brought out in detail how BD-N fails.
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1 Introduction
In recent years much attention has been paid to subtle foundational principles
of constructive analysis. (For background in constructive analysis, see [7, 8].)
These are principles that hold in the major traditions of mathematics, such
as Brouwer’s intuitionism, Russian constructivism, and classical mathematics,
yet do not follow from ZF-style axioms on the basis of constructive logic, such
as IZF. The principles of this character identified so far are Weak Markov’s
Principle [13, 16, 30], a version of Baire’s Theorem [19], and, most importantly
for our purposes, the boundedness principles BD and BD-N.
By way of explaining these boundedness principles, a sequence (an) of nat-
ural numbers is pseudo-bounded if limn→∞ an/n = 0. A set of natural num-
bers is pseudo-bounded if every sequence of its members is pseudo-bounded.
Examples are bounded sets. Equivalently, as observed in [20], a set is pseudo-
bounded if every sequence (an) of its members is eventually bounded by the
identity function: for n large enough, an < n (or an ≤ n). (To see this equiv-
alence, consider large enough intervals within (an).) This latter formulation is
often easier to work with.
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BD is the assertion that every pseudo-bounded set of natural numbers is
bounded. BD-N is that every countable pseudo-bounded set of naturals is
bounded. They were first identified during Ishihara’s analysis of continuity
[17], as they are equivalent to sequentially continuous functions on certain met-
ric spaces being ǫ − δ continuous. Since their identification, they have become
central tools in the foundations of constructive analysis, especially the latter
[9, 10, 12, 18, 20].
It can be hard to imagine how BD or BD-N could fail, which is likely a
cause or effect of their being true in most systems. That notwithstanding,
in order to understand them better, it is useful to see when they are false.
Trivially BD implies BD-N, so when discussing their failure we will usually
restrict attention to the weaker of the two, the one more difficult to falsify, BD-
N. It turns out that the first models falsifying it did so unwittingly. BD-N is
new, and continuity is old. So models violating commonly accepted continuity
principles were developed long before BD-N was even identified. It was only later
that people looked back and realized that the only way that those continuity
properties could fail was through the failure of BD-N.
There are several shortcomings to this state of affairs, which the current work
is intended to address. One is that these first models seem somewhat ad hoc for
this purpose, falsifying BD-N almost by accident. In contrast, the topological
models presented here seem to be the natural models. (For discussion about
naturality, see also the questions at the end. For background on topological
models, see [14, 15].) That is, to violate BD-N, you’d need a sequence which
is sort-of bounded while also sort-of unbounded. Without thinking much about
it, you might well guess that either a generic bounded sequence or a generic
unbounded sequence would do the trick. This turns out to be exactly right, as
we will see. Similarly, to violate BD, you’d need a set which is simultaneously
bounded and unbounded, after a fashion. The first guess is again a generic set,
either bounded or unbounded; again, this does it.
A second shortcoming of the prior state of knowledge is that the way we know
BD-N to fail in these first models is indirect: BD-N plus other foundational
axioms imply some continuity principle; said continuity principle fails; check
that the other axioms hold; hence BD-N fails. We are left with the unsatisfying
feeling of not really knowing just why BD-N fails. What is the pseudo-bounded
sequence which is not bounded? Or is there something else going on? This is
also addressed later, when for some of these models the indirect argument above
is unraveled to reveal just how BD-N fails.
Finally, the first proofs of the independence of BD-N were in Lietz’s thesis
[22], which also contains the bulk of the known models violating BD-N. Al-
though these models are all ultimately realizability models, the presentation is
category-theoretic through and through, and so difficult or even inaccessible for
non-category theorists to understand. The presentation of these models given
here is purely in terms of realizability for arithmetic and analysis.
Returning to the alleged naturality of the topological models, a good test
for naturality is whether the model, while violating BD or BD-N, violates as
little else as possible. That is, it should prove independence results around
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BD or BD-N. For instance, Doug Bridges [11] has shown that, under BD-N,
anti-Specker spaces (see below) are closed under products, and asked whether
the converse holds. If there is a canonical model, whatever that might mean,
falsifying BD-N, that would be the first place to look for this question. Such
a model would be the gentlest possible extension of a classical model making
BD-N false. If the failure of BD-N did not imply that anti-Specker spaces are
so closed, then in the canonical model the anti-Specker spaces would retain this
closure. This is in fact just what is shown in section 3, that in the first model
of section 2 the anti-Specker spaces are closed under Cartesian product. Hence
such closure does not imply BD-N.
We hope that the models presented here will make investigations around
BD and BD-N easier, as well as promote interest in topological models more
generally.
A word about the meta-theory is in order. This article, like almost all in
mathematics, is intended to be within classical mathematics. This would be
unremarkable, except that it is at the same time an article about constructive
mathematics. Just as we are more upset when religious leaders engage in even
common sexual transgressions than when lay people do, because we hold them
to a higher standard, so are people who discuss constructive mathematics ques-
tioned about their use of Excluded Middle when almost everyone else does so
without even noticing it. Given the likely readership, though, it would be a
service to the reader to bring out the not fully constructive principles in this
work when they are used. This is done, for instance, in the proof of 2.2, which is
phrased as a proof by contradiction, and in reality uses only the Fan Theorem,
as is observed there. The bottom line caveat to the reader, though, is that this
work has not been vetted to be purely constructive, and may contain unnoticed
applications of Excluded Middle.
2 Topological models
As discussed above, we are looking for a sequence (or, in the case of BD, set)
which is bounded in a way, yet also unbounded in another way. The obvious
guess is to take either a generic bounded or a generic unbounded sequence. That
is, the topological space would be the space of bounded sequences, or unbounded
sequences. The topological model over a space introduces a generic elements of
that space, so in this case we’d have a generic bounded, or unbounded, sequence.
Not surprisingly, this works for both BD-N and BD.
2.1 The natural model for ¬BD-N
Let the points in the topological space T be the functions f from ω to ω with
finite range, that is, enumerations of non-empty finite sets. A basic open set p is
(either ∅ or) given by an unbounded sequence gp of integers, with a designated
integer stem(p), beyond which gp is non-decreasing. Furthermore, gp(stem(p)) ≥
max{gp(i) | i < stem(p)}. A function f is in p if f(n) = gp(n) for n < stem(p)
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and f(n) ≤ gp(n) otherwise. 1 Notice that p ∩ q is either empty (if gp and gq
through their stems are incompatible) or is given by taking the larger of the two
stems, the function up to that stem from the condition with the larger stem, and
the pointwise minimum beyond that. Hence these open sets do form a basis.
Let M be the full topological model built over T . For those with less ex-
perience with such models, perhaps the easiest way to think of this is that we
are forcing over the partial order of open subsets of T without modding out
by double negation. (The following discussion applies to any topological space
T .) Sets in M are named by sets in the ground model V . Inductively in V ,
M0 = ∅,Mλ =
⋃
α<λMα, andMα+1 is the power set ofMα×O(T ), where O(T )
is the set of open subsets of T . Clearly all the action is happening at the succes-
sor stage. A member σ of Mα+1, called a term, is of the form {〈σj , rj〉 | j ∈ J},
where σj is (inductively) a term, rj an open set, and J an index set. Thinking
of rj as a forcing condition, rj forces σj to be a member of σ; alternatively,
rj is the truth value of the sentence “σj ∈ σ”. Just as with classical forcing,
the ground model embeds canonically into M : xˆ = {〈yˆ, T 〉 | y ∈ x} provides
a canonical M -name for each x ∈ V . Where this differs from classical forcing
is that classically for a sentence φ to be true in the generic extension its truth
value must be a dense open subset of T , whereas here the truth value would
have to be all of T . Hence it might be misleading to use the word “generic” in
this context, since density plays little of a role here. Still, we are going to do
so, because we have no better name for what is in forcing called “the generic
G”, given by the term {〈rˆ, r〉 | r ∈ O(T )}. To try to convey some intuition,
G looks like a generic point of T , which is in whatever open set you happen
to be looking at at the moment. (For more background on topological models,
see [14, 15]. What is there called the topological model is here described as the
full model, to distinguish it from other possible models. The fullness consists of
it containing all possible terms. The discussion in the addendum to [24] might
also be of use here.)
Particularizing to the space T at hand, G is forced to be a function with
domain the natural numbers, themselves the canonical image of the ground
model natural numbers, and can be characterized by the relation p  “G(n) =
x” iff n < stem(p) and gp(n) = x. Our interest is really in the range of G.
The reason we force to get G as a function, and not just the range, is that
BD-N refers to countable sets, that is, the ranges of functions with domain the
natural numbers. We would have to do something at some point to make the
set being built countable, so it just seemed easier to take care of this up front.
The primary result of this note is
Theorem 2.1 T  rng(G) is countable and pseudo-bounded, yet not bounded.
Also, T  Dependent Choice (DC).
A major reason we’re interested in showing that the model validates DC is
1The referee has observed that this topology is the join of two other topologies, namely
the product topology on Baire space as a product of copies of N, and the “lower” topology
for non-decreasing maps, with basic open sets {f ∈ T | ∀nf(n) ≤ g(n)} for g non-decreasing.
They pointed out that T is therefore zero-dimensional and Hausdorff, and hence sober.
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that it makes the failure of BD-N that much more striking. One might consider
arguing for BD-N by, given f : N→ N, trying to build a sequence with a0 = f(0)
and an+1 = min{x | x ∈ rng(f), x > an}; if this construction succeeds, then f
is not pseudo-bounded, and if it doesn’t then f looks to be bounded. This will
not work, if for no other reason than that this minimum might not exist. With
DC, that last objection loses its validity: as long as {x | x ∈ rng(f), x > an}
is inhabited, a value could be chosen for an+1, and with DC these values could
be strung together into a total sequence. Hence DC makes it even harder for
BD-N to fail. Another reason to want DC is that it is useful for developing
analysis. So this model then provides a nice testing ground or example for the
development of analysis in the absence of BD-N.
Proof: It is immediate that rng(G) is countable, as G is total: given n, {p |
stem(gp) > n} covers T , and each such p forces n ∈ dom(G). It is almost as
immediate that rng(G) is not bounded: given a potential bound B ∈ N, since
gp is unbounded, p can be extended (using standard terminology from forcing
here, the meaning being “shrunk” as a set) to an open set forcing B ∈ rng(G);
hence no p can force that any particular natural is a bound, i.e. nothing forces
that rng(G) is bounded, so T forces that rng(G) is unbounded.
The work is in showing pseudo-boundedness. The primary lemma for that
is:
Lemma 2.2 Let p be an open set forcing “t ∈ rng(G)”, and I an integer such
that maxn<stem(p) gp(n) ≤ I ≤ gp(stem(p)). Then there is a q extending p with
the same stem and gq(stem(q)) ≥ I forcing “t ≤ Iˆ”.
Proof: If r is an open set, for i ≤ gr(stem(r)), let ri ⊆ r be such that stem(ri) =
stem(r) + 1, gri(stem(r)) = i, and for n 6= stem(r), gri(n) = gr(n). Notice that⋃
i ri = r.
Fix I. Say that p′ ⊆ p is a candidate if maxn<stem(p′) gp′(n) ≤ I ≤
gp′(stem(p
′)). If p′ is a candidate, say that q′ ⊆ p′ is good if q′ satisfies the
conclusion of the lemma as applied to p′. We want to show that p itself has a
good extension. Notice that if i ≤ I and p′ is a candidate, so is p′i.
Suppose that each pi (i ≤ I) had a good extension, say qi. Then so would p,
as follows. Let stem(q) = stem(p). For n < stem(q), let gq(n) be the common
value gp(n); let gq(stem(q)) be I; for all other n, let gq(n) be mini gqi(n). As
described above, q is covered by the qis, and each qi is a subset of q
i, so q 
“t ≤ Iˆ”.
This means that if p0 := p does not have a good extension, neither does some
p1 := pi. Continuing inductively, let p
n+1 be pni , where i ≤ I and p
n
i does not
have a good extension. The initial parts of the pns cohere to form a function
f ∈ p with range (a subset of) {0, 1, ... , I}. Let r ⊆ p be a neighborhood
of f forcing a particular value J for t. We have that J ≤ I, as follows. Since
t is forced to be in the range of G, extend r to a neighborhood s of f forcing
t = G(m) for some natural number m. Without loss of generality, stem(s) can
be taken to be larger than m. By the choice of f , G(m) ≤ I, as claimed.
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Eventually the values of gs are all ≥ I, so, if need be, shrink s by extend-
ing the initial part consistently with f until gs(stem(s)) ≥ I. This is a good
extension of some pn, which is a contradiction.
Alternatively, this argument could be done on the basis of the Fan Theorem
instead of a proof by contradiction, since we are looking at trees with I-much
branching.
In the end, we will need a more general version of the preceding.
Lemma 2.3 Let p be an open set forcing “t ∈ rng(G)”, and M ≥ stem(p), I
an integer such that maxn<M gp(n) ≤ I ≤ gp(M). Then there is a q extending p
such that for n < M gq(n) = gp(n), stem(q) = stem(p), and gq(M) ≥ I, forcing
“t ≤ Iˆ”.
Notice that the previous lemma is the special case of the current one in which
M = stem(p).
Proof: Using the notation from the beginning of the last proof, {pi | i ≤
gp(stem(p))} is an open cover over p. Similarly, {(pi)j | j ≤ gp(stem(p) + 1)}
is an open cover of pi, so that the collection of (pi)js as both i and j vary is
an open cover of p. Continuing this procedure for M − stem(p) many steps,
we have an open cover qk (k < K) of p such that stem(qk) = M . Apply-
ing the previous lemma to each qk produces a collection q
′
k such that each
one forces “t ≤ Iˆ”. The union
⋃
k q
′
k can be restricted to a basic open set
q as follows: stem(q) = stem(p), gq(n) = gp(n) for n < M , and for larger
n gq(n) = mink(q
′
k(n)). q is as desired.
The benefit of this lemma is that it enable one to do fusion arguments, like in
Axiom A forcing [1] and in arguments to get minimal degrees in computability
theory, to get the pseudo-boundedness of G, as well as DC.
Lemma 2.4 T  rng(G) is pseudo-bounded.
Proof: Suppose p  an is a countable sequence through rng(G). We need to
show that p forces that an is eventually bounded beneath n. That means that
p forces the existence of an index N beyond which an is forced to be less than
n. Since forcing existence is local, for any f ∈ p we need to find a neighborhood
r of f forcing the adequacy of a particular index N .
Fix f ∈ p. Let N be sup(rng(f)). Let M be the smallest natural such that
gp(M) > N . Notice that, since f ∈ p, M ≥ stem(p). Apply the previous lemma
to t := aN to extend p to qN . (Notice that f ∈ qN , since gp and gqN agree up
to M , and beyond that gqN (n) always bounds rng(f).)
Now apply the previous lemma to p := qN , t := aN+1, I := N + 1, and M
the least index n such that gqN (n) ≥ N + 1. This produces a basic open set
qN+1 containing f forcing aN+1 ≤ N + 1.
6
Again, apply the previous lemma to p := qN+1, t := aN+2, I := N + 2, and
M the least index n such that gqN+1(n) ≥ N + 2. This produces a basic open
set qN+2 containing f forcing aN+2 ≤ N + 2.
By continuing this process for ever increasing values of I, the function which
is the pointwise limit of gqN+i is unbounded, and so (together with stem(p))
determines an open set
⋂
n qn containing f that by construction forces each an
(n ≥ N) to be bounded by n.
In order to prove DC, we need appropriate analogues of the two lemmas
from above.
Lemma 2.5 Let p be an open set forcing “∃y ψ(y)”, and I an integer such
that I ≤ gp(stem(p)). Then there is a q extending p with the same stem and
gq(stem(q)) ≥ I forcing ψ(σ) for some term σ.
Proof: This argument is similar to that of the first lemma above. We need
the same notation: pi, for i ≤ gp(stem(p)), is (to put it informally) the same as
p only the value at the stem(p)th place is fixed to be i. If each pi has a good
extension qi, meaning one satisfying the conclusion of the lemma (when starting
from pi), then so does p, as follows. Let q be such that stem(q) = stem(p), for
n < stem(q) gq(n) is the common value gp(n), gq(stem(q)) is I, and for all other
n gq(n) is mini gqi(n). q is covered by the qis, each qi is a subset of q
i, and each
qi forces ψ(σi). The σis can be amalgamated as follows. Recall that a term τ
is a set of the form {〈τj , rj〉 | j ∈ J}, where τj is (inductively) a term, rj an
open set, and J an index set. The restriction of τ to some open set r, τ ↾ r, is
defined as {〈τj , rj ∩ r〉 | j ∈ J}. Intuitively, τ ↾ r is empty until you’re beneath
r, at which point it becomes τ . The amalgamation we want is σ :=
⋃
i σi ↾ q
i,
which roughly stands for “wait until you know which qi you’re in, then become
σi”. This σ witnesses that q is a good extension of p.
So if p0 := p did not have a good extension, neither would some p1 := pi, nor
some p2 := p1j , etc. The p
ns cohere, or converge, to some f ∈ p. By hypothesis,
f has some neighborhood r forcing ψ(σ) for some σ. If need be, shrink r (to r′
say) consistently with f so that gr′(stem(r
′)) ≥ I. This r′ is a good extension
of some pn, which is a contradiction. Again, as with 2.2, instead of a proof by
contradiction, the Fan Theorem suffices.
Lemma 2.6 Let p be an open set forcing “∃y ψ(y)”, and M ≥ stem(p), I an
integer such that I ≤ gp(M). Then there is a q extending p such that for n <
M gq(n) = gp(n), stem(q) = stem(p), and gq(M) ≥ I, forcing ψ(σ) for some
term σ.
The proof of this lemma is to the previous proof as the proof of the lemma
before that is to the one before it, and so is left to the reader.
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Lemma 2.7 T  DC.
Proof: Suppose p  “∀x ∃y φ(x, y)”. (The argument is unchanged if x and
y are restricted to some set.) Let a0 be given. Using the previous lemma, at
stage 0, extend p to p0, with the same stem and the same value I at stem(p),
forcing φ(a0, a1) for some a1. At stage 1, let N1 be the least index n such that
gp0(n) > I, and extend p0 to p1, with the same stem and same values at all in-
dices n ≤ N1, forcing φ(a1, a2) for some a2. Continue inductively, at stage n pre-
serving some occurrence of an integer at least as large as I+n as a function value,
so that
⋂
n pn is an open set. By construction,
⋂
n pn  ∀n ∈ N φ(an, an+1).
This sequence of lemmas completes the proof of the main theorem.
2.2 The natural model for ¬BD
BD is the assertion that every pseudo-bounded set of natural numbers is bounded:
BD-N without the assumption of countability. So BD implies BD-N, and the
model above falsifying BD-N must also falsify BD. We can do better than that
though. The generic above was not bounded: it is false that there exists a
bound. That’s different from being unbounded: ∀N∃i ∈ A i > N . There
are two good reasons that G above was not unbounded. For one, since G is
countable, if it were unbounded it would not be pseudo-bounded. (Let a0 be
G(0); given an = G(m), let an+1 be G(k), where k is the least integer greater
than m such that G(k) > G(m), which exists by unboundedness. Then (an)
would witness that G is not pseudo-bounded.) For another, even if G were not
countable, DC is enough to take an unbounded set and return a witness to non-
pseudo-boundedness. So we would like to find a counter-example to BD which
is unbounded.
More than that, we would like to find a counter-example to a weakened
version of BD. This is based on the following:
Definition 2.8 A ⊆ N is sequentially bounded if every sequence of members
of A is bounded.
Notice that if A is sequentially bounded then A is pseudo-bounded. The
converse does not hold, as G from the previous theorem illustrates. So the
assertion “if A is sequentially bounded then A is bounded” differs from BD
in that it has a stronger hypothesis, and so is a weaker assertion. Weaker
assertions are harder to falsify. Hence the goal is to produce a sequentially
bounded, unbounded set. Can this be done?
The answer is a very satisfying yes, satisfying because it so well complements
the previous construction. Recall that it was argued that the best guess for the
last section’s counter-example was to take a generic over either the bounded
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or the unbounded sequences. It turned out that the bounded sequences did
the trick. The best guess here would be a generic over either the bounded or
unbounded sets. It turns out that the choice this time is the other one: the
unbounded sets.
So let T be the space of all unbounded sets X of natural numbers. A basic
open set O is given by a pair 〈PO, NO〉, so called because PO is a finite set of
naturals giving the positive information and NO a set of naturals giving the
negative information. X ∈ O iff PO ⊆ X and NO ∩X is finite. (Hence for the
second component we could have taken instead an equivalence class from the
power set of N mod the ideal of finite sets.) For O and U open, O ∩ U is given
by 〈PO ∪ PU , NO ∪NU 〉, so the opens given do form a basis. Notice that O = ∅
iff NO is cofinite.
Let M be the full topological model over T , and G the canonical generic:
O  n ∈ G iff n ∈ PO. Notice that nothing can ever be forced out of G.
Theorem 2.9 T  G is unbounded and sequentially bounded.
Proof: It is easy to see that T  G is unbounded. Let X ∈ T , and n ∈ N.
Choose j > n, j ∈ X . Let O be given by 〈{j}, ∅〉. Then X ∈ O  j ∈ G. So T
is covered by open sets forcing “∃i > n i ∈ G”, hence T forces the same. Since
n was arbitrary, T  “∀n ∃i > n i ∈ G.”
As for sequential boundedness, let O  “an is a sequence through G”. We
can assume that O is basic and non-empty. We will need the following fact
about the topology: if P ′O is a finite extension of PO, then the open set O
′
determined by 〈P ′O, NO〉 is compatible with (i.e. is not disjoint from) every
open subset of O. Namely, for V ⊆ O basic open, PV ∪ (N − NV ) ∈ V ; since
V ⊆ O, PV ∪ (N−NV ) ∈ O; that means (PV ∪ (N−NV )) ∩NO is finite; hence
P ′O ∪ PV ∪ (N−NV ) ∈ O
′ ∩ V .
Returning to the main argument, let XO ∈ O be N−NO. For each n, some
basic open neighborhood U of XO determines the values of an. U is given by
〈PU , NU 〉, where PU is a finite subset of XO, and, crucially, NU differs from
NO on a finite set, because U is taken to include XO. Since an open set is
unchanged by a finite change to the second component, we can take NU to be
NO. By the observation above, any other non-empty basic open subset of O is
compatible with U . So any other value of an that could be forced by a subset
of O has to be compatible with the one forced by U . So O is covered by opens
all forcing the same value of an, hence O forces an to have that value. Since O
also forces “an ∈ G”, and the only numbers O forces to be in G are those in
PO, O  an ∈ PO. Since n was arbitrary, O forces (an) to be bounded.
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3 Application: Anti-Specker
Douglas Bridges has shown [11] that BD-N implies that the spaces that satisfy
a version of the anti-Specker property are closed under products. He asked
whether the reverse implication is true. Here we show it is not, by showing
that in the model of the previous section the anti-Specker spaces are closed
under products. As stated in the introduction, the purpose of this exercise is
not really anything about anti-Specker itself. Rather, the goal is to bolster the
claim that the models above are the natural, gentlest models of the failure of
BD and BD-N. If they are the right models, then they will falsify as little
else that was true in the ground model as possible. Presumably, all classically
true statements that do not imply BD resp. BD-N would remain true in these
models. It is entirely possible that the same result about anti-Specker could be
achieved by consideration of the earlier-known realizability models (see below, or
[2, 12, 22]). But nobody has a good guess which of those models satisfy this anti-
Specker closure property and which not. Furthermore, it might be very difficult
to determine whether the anti-Specker closure holds or not, as opposed to the
argument in the topological model, which admittedly involves some detail, but
is ultimately straightforward. To give another example of the same situation,
it has recently been shown that the Riemann Permutation Theorem, which is
implied by BD-N, is strictly weaker than it, via an argument much like the anti-
Specker proof below [25]. The realizability experts were then asked whether
RPT held in any of the realizability models. They did not have a clear guess in
which it would, and were not able to prove or refute RPT in them. That such
well-qualified experts could not do this indicates how much easier all of this is
with the topological models.
A metric space X satisfies the one-point anti-Specker property (notation:
AS1(X)) if, for every one-point extension Z = X ∪ {∗} of X and sequence
(zn)(n ∈ N) through Z, if (zn) is eventually bounded away from each point in
X , then (zn) is eventually bounded away from X . (The name refers to Specker’s
Theorem, which is that in computable mathematics the closed interval [0,1] does
not have this property [13, 28].) Other variants of anti-Specker include AS(X):
every sequence (zn) through any metric space Z ⊇ X eventually bounded away
from each point in X is eventually bounded away from X . Z can also be
held fixed (notation: AS(X)Z). It is known, for instance, that AS
1([0, 1])
iff AS([0, 1])R [9]. For more background on the anti-Specker properties, see
[5, 6, 9, 10, 11].
The purpose of this section is achieved with this
Theorem 3.1 T  AS1(X) ∧ AS1(Y )→ AS1(X × Y ).
Proof: Let p  “AS1(X) ∧ AS1(Y ) ∧ (zn) is a sequence through X × Y ∪ {∗}
eventually bounded away from each (x, y) ∈ X × Y, ” and f ∈ p. We must find
a neighborhood of f forcing “(zn) is eventually ∗.”
By way of notation, let xn and yn be terms such that p  “If zn ∈ X × Y
then zn = (xn, yn), and if zn = ∗ then xn = ∗ = yn.” Let I = sup(rng(f)).
Without loss of generality, p is basic open, with gp(stem(p)) ≥ I.
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Definition 3.2 A finite sequence of integers σ of length at least stem(p) is
compatible with p if for all i < stem(p) σ(i) = gp(i) and for all i with
stem(p) ≤ i < length(σ) σ(i) ≤ gp(i). For σ compatible with p, p ↾ σ is
the open set q ⊆ p such that stem(q) = length(σ), for i < stem(q) gq(i) = σ(i),
and otherwise gq(i) = gp(i).
Lemma 3.3 There is an open set q such that f ∈ q ⊆ p, stem(q) = stem(p),
and for n ∈ N there is a length in such that, for all σ of length in compatible
with q, either q ↾ σ  “xn (equivalently yn) = ∗” or q ↾ σ  “xn (equivalently
yn) 6= ∗.”
Proof: Let n ∈ N. First we prove a generalization of this lemma for this fixed
n. So let j ≥ stem(p), J ≥ I with J ≤ gp(j), and σ be a sequence of length j
compatible with p. We claim that there is an open set q extending p such that
stem(q) = j, gq ↾ j = σ, and gq(j) = J , and there is an i ≥ j such that, for all σ
of length i compatible with q, q ↾ σ decides whether xn (equiv. yn) is ∗ or not.
The proof of that claim is similar to that of the lemmas of the previous
section. For notational convenience, extend p if necessary so that j = stem(p).
So the claim is that we can build the desired q only by shrinking gp beyond
stem(p), and even that by not too much (at stem(p), we must still be at least
J).
Using the notation from the last section, if for each j ≤ J pj had such a good
extension qj with associated integer ij, then they could be amalgamated to a
good extension of p, with the amalgamation of the ij ’s being their maximum. So
if p had no good extension, then neither would some direct extension p1 := pj
of p. Similarly, p1 would itself have some direct extension p2 with no good
extension. Continuing countably often, the sequence of pN ’s determines an
h ∈ p. Some neighborhood r of h must determine whether xn is ∗ or not, which
can be restricted to a good extension of some pN . This contradicts the choice
of pN , so p must have a good extension.
Now apply the claim with n = 0, j = stem(p), and J = I, which determines
σ, to produce q0 and i0. Let n = 1, j ≥ i0 such that gq0(j) ≥ I + 1, and
J = I + 1. For each σ of length j compatible with q0 and with range bounded
by I, use the claim to construct a qσ and an iσ. There are only finitely many
such σ’s, so the qσ’s can be amalgamated via intersection to q1 and the iσ’s via
their maximum to i1. More generally, at stage k > 0, let n = k, j ≥ ik−1 such
that gqk−1(j) ≥ I + k, and J = I + k. Use the claim to construct the qσ’s and
iσ’s, which are then amalgamated to qk and ik.
Since the choice of J is unbounded as k runs through the natural numbers,
q :=
⋂
k∈N qk is an open set, and has the properties claimed.
Let q be as in the lemma. The members of q naturally form a tree Trq:
the nodes are those finite sequences compatible with q, and the members of q
are those paths through the tree with bounded range. At height j ≥ stem(q)
of Trq, the amount of splitting is gq(j) + 1. The nodes at height in determine
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whether xn and yn are ∗ or not. We will have use for subsets of q the members
of which have ranges that are uniformly bounded. (Such subsets are, of course,
not open.) Such subsets can be given as the set of paths through a subtree Tr
of Trq with a fixed bound on the ranges of its nodes, as follows.
Definition 3.4 A tree Tr ⊆ Trq is bounded if there is a J such that for all
σ ∈ Tr and j < length(σ) σ(j) < J.
Lemma 3.5 Let Tr ⊆ Trq be bounded. Then {σ ∈ Tr | length(σ) = in and
q ↾ σ  “xn 6= ∗”} is finite.
Proof: Suppose not. Since Tr (even Trq, for that matter) is finitely branching,
by Ko¨nig’s Lemma there is a path h such that each initial segment of h has such
an extension. (Note that we do not claim that h itself goes through infinitely
many such nodes, which would make our lives easier if it were true.) Since Tr
is bounded, h is actually a point in the topological space T .
For each natural number k, choose an nk and σk extending h ↾ k such
that q ↾ σk forces “xnk 6= ∗”. We can assume without loss of generality that
for increasing values of k the nk’s are also increasing and that the σk’s agree
with longer initial segments of h. Let xˆk be a term forced by σk to equal xnk
and forced by all other sequences of the same length as σk to equal ∗. Since
q  “xi = ∗ iff yi = ∗, ” we can similarly define yˆk to be a term forced by σk
to equal ynk and by all other same-lengthed sequences to equal ∗. Let zˆn be a
term standing for (xˆn, yˆn) when those components are not ∗ and ∗ when they
are. Notice that q  “zˆn is either zn or ∗,” so that (for arbitrary (x, y)) q  “If
(zn) is eventually bounded away from (x, y), then so is (zˆn).”
Since we are assuming that the σk’s agree with h on ever longer initial
segments, then σk has to extend h ↾ k. Hence if σ(k) 6= h(k) then for j > k q ↾
σ  “xˆj = ∗”. Hence q − {h}  “(xˆn) is eventually ∗, and so is eventually
bounded away from X , and so in particular is bounded away from each point
of X .” If q  “∀x ∈ X (xˆn) is eventually bounded away from x”, then, since
p  AS1(X), q  “(xˆn) is eventually ∗”. This, however, contradicts the choice
of (xˆn) and h, as no neighborhood of h can force that. Hence for some r ⊂ q
and x we have r  “x ∈ X, ” yet r 6 “(xˆn) is eventually bounded away from
x”. Coupled with the opening observation in this paragraph, no neighborhood
of h can force (xˆn) to be eventually bounded away from x. We would like to
thin this sequence so that x is the only point in X with this property.
Let r1 ⊆ q force “xˆnk1 is within 1 of x.” By extending r1 if necessary, we can
assume that stem(r1) ≥ length(σk1). In fact, it turns out to be useful if they are
equal. This can be arranged by thinning xˆj1 . That is, letting σ be gr1 ↾ stem(r1),
consider a term which is forced by q ↾ σ to be xˆnk1 and, whenever τ 6= σ has
the same length as σ, forced by q ↾ τ to be ∗. By abuse of notation, we will
use the same notation xˆnk1 for this new term. Furthermore, we want to thin
the sequence xˆn at places before nk1 . So for k < nk1 , change xˆk if need be to a
term standing for ∗.
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A desired effect of this thinning is that, for every node τ incompatible with σ,
q ↾ τ forces the sequence (xˆn) through (that means including) nk1 to be the con-
stant ∗. In order to force xˆnk1 to be within 1 of x, though, we have to be working
not just beneath q, but also beneath r1. So let s1 ⊆ q be such that stem(s1) =
stem(q), for stem(q) ≤ k < stem(r1) gs1(k) = min(gq(k), gr1(stem(r1))), and for
k ≥ stem(r1) gs1(k) = gr1(k). To summarize, s1  “ for k ≤ j1 either xˆk = ∗ or
xˆk is within 1 of x,” and stem(s1) = stem(q).
Let r2 ⊆ s1 force “xˆnk2 is within 1/2 of x.” By extending r2 if necessary, we
can assume that gs1(stem(r2)−1) ≥ I+1. Thin (xˆn) similarly to the above, and
define s2 ⊆ s1 to be such that stem(s2) = stem(q), for k < stem(r1) gs2(k) =
gs1(k), for stem(r1) ≤ k < stem(r2) gs2(k) = min(gs1(k), gr2(stem(r2))), and
for k ≥ stem(r2) gs2(k) = gr2(k). What this gets us is that the stem is not
increasing, for k between nk1 and nk2 xˆk is forced to be either ∗ or within 1/2
of x, and gs2(stem(r2) − 1) ≥ I + 1. That last fact will be preserved at future
steps, enabling us to take the intersection of these open sets at the end and still
have an open set.
Inductively, let ri+1 ⊆ si force xˆnki+1 is within 1/i of x.” By extending ri+1
if necessary, assume gsi(stem(ri+1)− 1) ≥ I+ i. Thin (xˆn), and define si+1 ⊆ si
to be such that stem(si+1) = stem(q), for k < stem(ri) gsi+1(k) = gsi(k), for
stem(ri) ≤ k < stem(ri+1) gsi+1(k) = min(gsi(k), gri+1(stem(ri+1))), and for
k ≥ stem(ri+1) gsi+1(k) = gri+1(k). As before, the stem is not increasing, for
k between nki and nki+1 xˆk is forced to be either ∗ or within 1/i of x, and
gsi+1(stem(ri+1)− 1) ≥ I + i.
Finally, let s∞ =
⋂
i si. We have h ∈ s∞, s∞ is open, and for all t ⊆ s∞, if
h ∈ t  “(x˜n) is a subsequence of (xˆn),” then t 6 “(x˜n) is eventually bounded
away from x.”
Just as we had earlier found r ⊆ q and x with r  “x ∈ X” yet r 6 “(xˆn) is
eventually bounded away from x,” there are t ⊆ s∞ and y such that t  “y ∈ Y, ”
yet t 6 “(yˆn) is eventually bounded away from y.” Because of the monotonicity
of (xˆn) approaching x forced by s∞, t 6 “(zˆn) is eventually bounded away from
(x, y).” Hence t 6 “(zn) is eventually bounded away from (x, y).” But this con-
tradicts the opening hypothesis of the whole theorem.
Armed with this lemma, we are almost done. Consider the sub-tree Tr1
of Trq of all finite sequences with entries less than or equal to I + 1. By the
lemma, {σ ∈ Tr1 | length(σ) = in and q ↾ σ  “xn 6= ∗”} is finite. Let jI+1
be the maximum of the lengths of the nodes in that set. So if some node of
greater length forces some xn not to be ∗, that node must have an entry larger
than I + 1. More particularly, there is a largest natural number, say M , such
that iM ≤ jI+1. For m > M , if a node forces xm not to be ∗, then that
node has an entry greater than I + 1. We start to define a function g. Let
g ↾ stem(q) = gq ↾ stem(q), and for stem(q) ≤ k ≤ jI+1, g(k) = I.
Now consider the larger sub-tree that on all levels ≤ jI+1 has only entries
≤ I (so is compatible with g), and beyond that all numbers ≤ I + 2 may
appear. (That is, σ is in the sub-tree iff σ(k) ≤ I for k ≤ jI+1 and σ(k) ≤ I +2
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otherwise.) Again, since there are only finitely many nodes forcing some xn
not to be ∗, let jI+2 be the maximum of their lengths. Extend g so that for
jI+1 < k ≤ jI+2, g(k) = I + 1. Notice that, when we use g as the bounding
sequence gr of a basic open set r, there will be no nodes allowed by g of length
between jI+1 and jI+2 allowing an xn not to be ∗.
In general, at stage e, consider the sub-tree with growth controlled up to
height jI+e by the amount of g built so far, and allowing entries up to I + e+1
after that. Let jI+e+1 bound the lengths of nodes which force some xn not to
be ∗. Extend g to be defined up to jI+e+1 with the new values being I + e.
After countably many of these steps, we will have defined g to be total.
Let the basic open set r be such that stem(r) = stem(q) and gr = g. Then
f ∈ r  “∀m > M xm = ym = ∗; ” in other words, f ∈ r  “(zn) is eventually
∗.”
4 Realizability models
The first model above was the first developed with the intention of falsifying
BD-N. It was not the first observed to falsify BD-N. Namely, Ishihara [16, 17]
showed that certain continuity principles are equivalent with certain founda-
tional constructive principles, among which is BD-N. Continuity was studied
well before BD-N was ever identified, and models, apparently all of them realiz-
ability models, were developed in which these continuity properties fail. It was
later observed that the other foundational principles identified by Ishihara hold
in these models, and then concluded that BD-N must fail. This is all very true,
but somewhat unsatisfying. The argument is roundabout. One would naturally
ask, for instance, just what is the pseudo-bounded yet unbounded set. The an-
swer is, of course, implicit in the chain of arguments leading to the conclusion
that BD-N fails in these models. It just takes some work digging through all of
that. In this section, we do that work for a representative (albeit not random)
sampling of these models.
4.1 Extensional realizability
In [22] Lietz provides a thorough overview of realizability models, and an analy-
sis of the continuity principles validated and falsified in some particularly inter-
esting ones. We will examine only one of these, extensional realizability (Ext).
To make the paper self-contained, we will give the basics of Ext; for more
background, see [27] or [3], ch. XI sec. 20.2
The objects are partial equivalence relations on the natural numbers, which
are also viewed as codes for computable functions (in some standard way) when
considering application. On the bottom level, the naturals themselves, exten-
sional equality is just equality. A function from N to N, i.e. a member of NN,
2Thanks are due here to Thomas Streicher for his correspondence explaining Ext to me.
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is given by an index e of a total computable function. If two such indices, say
e and e′, yield the same functions, then they are extensionally equal. For an
index i to stand for a function from NN to N, on equal inputs i must yield
equal outputs: {i}(e) = {i}(e′). (For i to be a function from NN to NN, the
outputs on extensionally equal inputs do not have to be numerically equal, just
extensionally equal.)
At the level of the naturals, extensionality plays no role, and we have the
following fact, true also in many other realizability models.
Proposition 4.1 In Ext, every function from N to N is computable.
Proof: Let e  “f is a function from N to N.” So e  “∀n ∃m f(n) = m.”
Hence ∀n ({e}(n))1  f(n) = {e}(n)0. So f = λn.{e}(n)0 is computable.
In fact, that proposition is almost enough to get BD-N to be true! Let A be
any countable set of naturals, and f any counting of A. Assuming a classical
meta-theory, either A is bounded or it’s not. If it is, great. If not, let a0 be
f(0) and an+1 be the first value of f greater than an. (an) is computable, and
witnesses that A is not pseudo-bounded.
So, in contrast to the topological models, there is no specific counter-example.
Does that mean that BD-N is true?
Theorem 4.2 ([22]) In Ext, BD-N is false.
What’s at stake is uniformity. Each instance of BD-N is true, just not
uniformly so.
Central to this proof is the KLST Theorem [21, 31]. As should become
clear, BD-N, or the lack thereof, could be viewed as the difference KLST being
true in the classical meta-theory and being true internally in Ext. It could
also be viewed as the gap within Ext between the full KLST and the fragment
of KLST that happens to be true there, sequential continuity. KLST is the
following result in classical computability (then called recursion) theory:
Theorem 4.3 (KLST) Every computable, integer-valued function, with domain
including the indices of the total computable functions, which is extensional on
those indices, is continuous. That is, there is a partial computable function M
such that, if {z}(y) converges for every y with {y} total, and {z}(y) = {z}(y′)
whenever {y} and {y′} are total and equal to each other, then, for {y} total,
M(z, y) is a modulus of convergence for {z}(y).
Lietz [22] used KLST to show the sequential continuity of all functions from
N
N to N in Ext. Ishihara’s [17] analysis of continuity has as a particular case
that BD-N yields that sequential continuity implies continuity. Troelstra [29]
showed that extensionality plus a modest amount of choice (which holds in Ext)
implies that not all functions from NN to N are continuous; a more accessible
source is [3], ch. XI sec. 19. Taken together, as observed in [22], Ext falsifies
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BD-N. The following argument takes those three proofs, applies them to Ext,
and pulls out the concrete counter-example to BD-N in Ext.
Proof: First, in Ext, every F : NN → N is sequentially continuous, as follows.
Suppose gn → g in NN. A realizer z  F : NN → N is also an index for computing
F : {z}(x) = F ({x}). Similarly, a realizer y  g ∈ NN computes g: {y} = g. By
KLST,M(z, y) is a modulus of convergence for F at g. However,M may not be
the index of a function of higher type in Ext, as it may not be extensional. We
seek something more modest – a modulus of convergence only for the sequence
(gn) – yet this modulus must be extensional. Since (gn) converges to g, there is
a k beyond which gn ↾M(z, y) = g ↾M(z, y). That is, for n > k, gn agrees with
g up to a modulus of convergence, so F (gn) = F (g). So evaluate {z}(yn) for n
from 0 through k, and pick the least n beyond which {z}(yn) is the constant
value F (g). That point witnesses the sequential continuity of F for gn → g.
By way of notation, let e0 be a canonical index for the constant 0 function:
{e0}(n) = 0. By saying g extends 0m, we mean that for x < m g(x) = 0. Later
on we will have use for the type 2 version of e0, which we call E0, the constant
0 function with inputs from NN.
Working in Ext, let {z} = F : NN → N. Let Az be {0} ∪ {m | there is
a g ∈ N → N extending 0m and eventually 0 with {z}(g) 6= {z}(e0)}. Az is
countable: there are only countably many eventually 0 g’s, say (gn); at stage
i evaluate {z}(gi); if that’s unequal to {z}(e0) then generate the appropriate
integers into Az , else generate another 0. Let ez be an index for a counting of
Az.
Moreover, Az is pseudo-bounded, as follows. Given a sequence (mn) of
members of Az, let hn be {e0} if mn < n, and the least corresponding g (i.e.
extending 0mn and eventually 0 with {z}(g) 6= {z}(e0)) if mn ≥ n. Since hn
extends 0n, hn → {e0}. By sequential continuity, we have an index beyond
which {z}(hn) = {z}(e0). Whenever {z}(hn) = {z}(e0), we cannot be in the
second case in the definition of hn. So we’re in the first case: mn < n. This is
exactly the pseudo-boundedness of Az. Let fz be the realizer for the pseudo-
boundedness of Az just constructed.
To show that BD-N is not realized, it is enough to suppose it is, and
come up with a contradiction. So suppose b  “if A ⊆ N is countable and
pseudo-bounded then A is bounded.” In particular, if z is an index as above,
{b}(ez, fz)  “Az is bounded,” and {b}(ez, fz)0 is a bound for Az . Let m be
{b}(eE0, fE0)0.
Given β : N → N, let Fβ : NN → N with index zβ be as follows. Given
α ∈ NN, Fβ(α) depends only on α(m + 1). If α(m + 1) = 0, then Fβ(α) =
0; else Fβ(α) = β(α(m + 1) − 1). In words, to see Fβ , take the countably
branching tree N<N; go up to the mth level; each node there has countably
many immediate successors; label the 0th successor with 0, and spread β out on
the other successors; given α a branch through that tree, follow α up to level
m+ 1 and return the value encountered there.
If β = {e0}, then Fβ = {E0}, and by extensionality, {b}(ezβ , fzβ )0 = m. On
the other hand, if β 6= {e0}, then Azβ = {0, ...,m+ 1}. Hence m would not be
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a bound for Azβ , and {b}(ezβ , fzβ)0 > m.
To conclude, λβ.{b}(eβ , fβ)0 is a total, computable, extensional function.
By KLST, it’s continuous. But we’ve just seen it’s not: at {e0} it returns m,
but does not do so in any neighborhood of {e0}.
4.2 fp-realizability
Beeson [2] introduced formal-provable realizability, abbreviated fp-realizability,
in order to show the independence from a theory of constructive arithmetic of
some continuity theorems, namely KLST (there called KLS), discussed in the
previous section, and MS (Myhill-Shepherdson), the variant of KLST for par-
tial computable functions. Beeson and Scedrov [4] extended fp-realizability to a
model of full IZF set theory. Much later, following Ishihara’s analysis of continu-
ity, Bridges et al. [12] realized that fp-realizability validates the other principles
Ishihara identified, and so must falsify BD-N. In this section, we bring out
exactly how BD-N fails.
For our purposes, the most important clause in the inductive definition of
realizability is implication. In standard realizability, this is given as:
e  φ→ ψ iff ∀x (x  φ→ {e}(x)  ψ).
Kleene also defined a modification of this realizability, that includes not only
that x must realize φ but also that φ must be provable:
e  φ→ ψ iff ∀x (x  φ ∧ Pr(φ)→ {e}(x)  ψ),
where Pr is some appropriate proof predicate. Beeson’s fp-realizability does
this one step better, by having that not only must x realize φ, and not only that
φ is provable, but even that the realizability of φ by x must be provable:
e  φ→ ψ iff ∀x (Pr(x  φ)→ {e}(x)  ψ),
where we can afford to eliminate the clause x  φ from the antecedent by the
presumed soundness of the provability predicate. What makes this work for our
purposes is that more needs to be put in than needs to be put out: the input
must be provably realizing, the output merely realizing.
The version of fp-realizability Beeson uses is non-numerical, in that the real-
izers themselves are suppressed. That is, a translation is given from formulas φ
to formulas φr, where the latter should be thought of as “φ is realized.” The rea-
son given for doing that is that it makes the proof of soundness of fp-realizability
easier, although it is observed that it actually makes a difference in some cases
about what’s realized, fortunately not in any cases of current interest. The
version of fp-realizability given below contains the realizers, because the reader
is likely to be more familiar and comfortable with such a presentation. It was
derived from Beeson’s non-numerical variant by making what seemed like the
only possible such extrapolation. The clauses are:
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e  φ iff φ (for φ atomic)
e  φ ∧ ψ iff e0  φ and e1  ψ
e  φ ∨ ψ iff (e0 = 0 and Pr(e1  φ)) or (e0 = 1 and Pr(e1  ψ)
e  φ→ ψ iff for all x if Pr(x  φ) then {e}(x)  ψ
e  ∀x φ(x) iff for all x e  φ(x)
e  ∃x φ(x) iff Pr(e1  φ(e0)).
As usual, ¬φ is an abbreviation for φ→ 0 = 1.
Theorem 4.4 ([12]) Under fp-realizability, BD-N is false.
By analogy with the realizability from the previous section, and realizability
in general, you might think that the failure of BD-N is once again the lack of
uniformity. Quite to the contrary, here we have a case of a particular counter-
example instead.
Definition 4.5 {w}(z) ↓<n if the function coded by w when applied to z con-
verges in fewer than n many steps with output less than n.
Definition 4.6 Let {v}(n) = max{k < n | ∀j, w, z < k if j codes a proof that
{w} is total then {w}(z) ↓<n}.
Proof: We will show that rng({v}) is the desired counter-example.
For the countability of rng({v}), we need that {v} is realized to be total. The
realizer for this is v itself, which works as long as {v} is actually total. That’s
the case because {v}(n) is the maximum of a bounded set, and membership in
the set is determined by a finite search.
Now consider the task of realizing that the range of {v} is not bounded. First
note that {v} is actually unbounded: to get an nk with {v}(nk) ≥ k, we need to
consider all proofs j < k that w < k codes a total function; by soundness {w}
then is total; so just wait long enough so that for all such w and z < k {w}(z)
has converged. So no e could realize that k is a bound to rng({v}), because nk is
a counter-example to that. Hence nothing can realize that rng({v}) is bounded.
By the definition of forcing a negation, everything realizes that rng({v}) is not
bounded.
The real work is showing that the range of {v} is pseudo-bounded. We need
to realize “if f enumerates a subset of rng{v} then there is a bound beyond
which f(n) ≤ n.” Suppose x provably realizes the antecedent:
Pr(x  ∀i ∃m f(i) = {v}(m)).
In particular, for all i, f(i) = {v}({x}(i)0).
Let N > x code such a proof. In particular, N also proves that {x} is total,
which is all we need. Then for n > N
f(n) = {v}({x}(n)0)
= max {k < {x}(n)0 | ∀j, w, z < k if j codes a proof
that w is total then {w}(z) ↓<{x}(n)0}.
Consider any k > n, by way of seeing whether it’s in the set above. Let j, w, z
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be N, x, n, respectively. We need to consider whether {x}(n) ↓<{x}(n)0. That
could not happen, since {x}(n) ≥ {x}(n)0, as a pair is at least as large as each
of its components. So f(n) is the max of a set which includes nothing greater
than n, hence f(n) ≤ n.
5 Questions
Both topological models presented here were called the natural models. This was
done because it feels right. They seem like the obvious guesses for topological
models violating BD and BD-N. Also, they seem to violate as little else as
possible, as for instance the property of anti-Specker spaces discussed still holds.
But what could it mean for these models to be natural? How could that be made
more precise?
What other independence results could these models show? What other
consequences of BD and BD-N might still hold in them?
We discussed two realizability models, one with a specific counter-example,
the other with no counter-example, just a lack of uniformity. The topological
models both have counter-examples. Is there a topological failure of BD or BD-
N with no one counter-example? This is possible on general principles: it could
be that every pseudo-bounded set is not not bounded, while there is no open
set forcing a bound for each pseudo-bounded set simultaneously. A general way
of doing this is forcing with settling [26, 23]. The reason that answer is not
satisfactory is that settling does not produce a model of IZF. Power Set must
fail; even Subset Collection would. So what would be a topological model of
IZF in which each instance of BD (resp. BD-N) holds densely but BD (resp.
BD-N) doesn’t?
We discussed the models over the space of bounded sequences and the space
of unbounded sets. What are the models like over the space of unbounded
sequences and the space of bounded sets? Is there anything interesting going
on there, especially relative to BD and BD-N?
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